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March $6, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SEN ATE S4573 .:---
EVENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Mr. UA.t'fBF'IELD. Mr. Pres.ldent, in 
recent weeks. events in Southeast Asia 
have eiC&Iated to a point that, I think, 
Calla tol' t:be continued attention of the 
Senate, u well as tbe adm1nlst.rat1on. 
We know that the Palhet Lao and the 
North Vietnamese in Laos nwnber, ac-
cording to the President's figures-and 
the.oe are North Vietnamese-something 
on the order of 67,000. They have ad-
vanced into and beyond the Plaines des 
Jarres and are reportedly within 20 miles 
of the Royal Laotian capital of Luang 
Prabang. 
We know also that as a result of the 
successes of the Pathet Lao and the North 
Vietnamese--they are primru:ily North 
Vietnamese successes-that an exchange 
o! letters has occurred between Prince 
Souphanouvong, the leader of the Pathet 
Lao, and Prince Souvanna Phowna, 
Prime Minister of the Royal Laotian 
Government. 
The letter sent by Prince Souphanou-
vong has been received by Prince Sou-
vanna Phouma and, I dare say, that be 
and his cabinet are looltlng into the con-
tents with great cru·e at this time. 
I assume, also, that what is contained 
in that letter has been brought to the 
attention of the U.S. Government and 
that it, likewise, is giving this matter 
careful attention. 
I would hope, Mr. President, that the 
situation in Le.os could be stabilized 
through a meeting between the two 
princes, who are halt brothers !or a dis-
cussion of the contents o! the letter. It is 
to be hoped that some sort of agreement 
might be reached which would bring a 
degree of peace to a very, very peaceful 
people. 
In addition, perhaps the International 
Contml Q>mmlssion, which is still func-
tioning in Laos, and does maintain con-
tact between the Pathet Lao strongholds 
at Samn-eua and Phong Saly, as well as 
in the territory under the control of the 
Royal Laotian Government, might be 
beefed up, that their use as interme-
diaries would be furthered, and that 
whatever services they could offer, to 
bring an end to the dl!flcult sUua.tion in 
Laos, would be forthcoming. 
Furthermore, I join wholeheartedly 1n 
the plea. ot the President of the United 
States to the United Kingdom and the 
Soviet Union, the cochairmen of the 
Geneva conferees to reconvene that 
meeting- to me, it 1s immaterial whether 
it is the 196Z or the 1954 meeting-for 
the purpose of trying to bring abOut a 
guarantee of the neutrality of Laos which 
so many of u.s--14 nations, I believ~ 
agreed to in 1.962. 
It is quite );)0661ble that the situation 
unless faced up to 1n this manner, or 
something approaching it, ma.y well get 
out of hand. 
I would point out to my colleagues that 
at the present time there is a Chinese-
built road extending from Phong Saly, 
one of the Pathet Lao strongholds, in the 
northwestern part of Laos through Meng 
La, 1n Yunnan, a Chinese province, down 
to Muong Sal, wpich 1n looltlng at the 
map I would hazard a guess is probably 
20 miles from the border of Burma. 
There is a,nother road from Meng La 
in Yunnan extending southward toward 
a town called Muong Lo, which would 
tie up with the roa.d to Dienbienphu 1n 
Vietnam. In a iOUthwesterly direction, 
the roe.c1 exten& from Muong Sal to 
Muong Houn, and it is within about 30 
miles of the Thai border. According to 
my information, it is st!ll being built. 
It is estimated there are 8,000 to 10,000 
Chinese along this road, mostly in labor 
battalions, but with a few antiaircraft 
battallons as well, for the protection of 
the Chinese roadbuilders. 
All of these factors should be taken 
into consideration in any disc\l&Sion of 
Laos so that the American people will 
have the facts laid out before them and 
be aware of just what the potential and 
possibilities are in that country. 
I conunend the President for his show-
ing of forbearance. But I disassociate the 
attacks on the Ho Chi Minh trail which 
are, in effect, troops of Vietnam and con-
nected with the war in the fighting in 
other areas of Laos where, I understand, 
although it cannot be proven, that Tha.i 
troops have been involved in seeldng to 
block the extension of the power o! the 
Pathet Lao and Vietnamese. 
Then there is the question of Cam-
bodia. Some people seem to be very happy 
that Prince Sihanouk has been over-
thrown and 1s now 1n Peking where state-
ments attributed to him have been is-
sued of late. It is my understanding that 
Prince SihanoUk has indicated that as 
long as he 1s out of Cambodia, he \Wll 
divide his time between Peking and 
Moscow. 
I regret to see this form of event, be-
cause in my opinion Sihanouk was a 
very shrewd political leader dedicated 
to keeping alive the neutrality and the 
entity of Cambodia. He was able to keep 
his country in relative peace and sta-
b111ty, as contrasted with the surround-
ing nations. He did so in most difficult 
circumstances because he was pressured 
from all borders, from the west by the 
Thais, and once in a while by red Khmer 
Serai units from the north, by the Viet-
cong and the North Vietnamese, who 
number something in the order of 45,000 
to 50,000 in the northern province of 
Cambodia stretched out !rom the east 
border of VIetnam to the west border of 
Cambodia at Battam.bang, which borders 
on Thailand. 
Now we have a deposed prince, living 
in Moscow, who has been accused of 
having great swns of money in Swiss 
banks but the fact is that he has au-
thorized all Swiss banks to disclose the 
facts to prove or disprove this charge. 
He has been accused of a number of 
other things, but ne can never be accused 
of his lack of dedication to Cambodia and 
its preservation. Before there is too much 
rejoicing at his overthrow, it would be 
well to bear in mind that of all the coun-
tries in Indochina., Cambodia under Si-
hanouk is the onl:y cow1try into which 
we have not poured Lilli• .ns in aid in 
recent years and the only country where 
we have not h ad Americans fighting and 
dying during this u·aglc conflict. What 
are we to expect now? Aid programs for 
Cambodia? An extension of military op-
erations into that country? What would 
this Nation gain from that eourse? 
I am concerned because with the 
overthrow of Prince Sihanoult and his 
being establish ed \n I eking, a new situ-
ation has developed in Southeast Asia 
as far as Cambodia is concerned. I re-
iterate that It may well be that we were 
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no~ too happy with Cambodia's neutrality 
at ~1mes. But it was an area 1n which a 
certain degree of stability had been 
achieved in Southeast Asia. 
If events develop to an extent that the 
present situation brings about an expan-
sion of the war or a civU war in Cam-
bodia, I would hope most devoutly that 
this Nation would stay out of it and 
would not intervene in any way in the 
a1fa1rs o1 Cambodia. That we would not 
once apJn tall into the trap of extending 
aid to one faction and in that way taking 
the ftrst step toward a new involvement. 
I 'woli1d hope, rather, that this Nation 
would do all in i~ powers to keep the 
;war from Spreading beyond its present 
~ and thereby prevent a situation 
~would req_¢.re an increase in com-
~t of American forces rather than 
the 'ptia.sed withdrawal that the Presl-
deat has wtsely put into effect up to this 
- time. 
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the 
m-.l0r1ty leader yield? 
~- MANSl"lELD. I yield. 
M:l'. SCOT'I'. Mr. President. I thank 
the maJority leader for yielding at this 
time. 
I think this is the time to make it 
clear that, as far as I am concerned, I 
think the d.lstingulshed majority leader 
has correctly and accurately stated a 
po~t of vie;w which Americans ought to 
listen to v~ry carefully and with which 
I 11nd ~self in broad general agreement. 
~re has been, ftrst of all, a tendency 
to l'l!l'ard Prince Sihanouk as something 
of a playboy. Yet, underneath that ro.-
tund exterior, there has proven to be a 
very shrewd manipula.tor of forces much -
larpr than hi& own ln offering a way 
to preaerve this precarious neutr(tlity 
tor Quite a long time. 
There is also .a tendency, I notice, in 
dbiCusli1ng the overthrow of Sihanouk to 
draw t4e assumption that because those 
who overthrew him appear to be oriented 
to the West, that this would necessarily 
be a ~()Od thing for · the United States. 
It fs a broadening of the war and 
certa:lnly would not be a good thing if 
it le&<la to a decision by Peking or Mos-
cow to come1nto that country. The situ-
ation ;would be much worse, because no 
matter whether the power which over-
threw Sihanouk proves to be ·oriented 
to the West or to the East, any power 
in Cambodia and lndeed the whole na-
tion can be overt:;!'Own in a matter of 
hours or days by anyone having the will 
to do 1!0. 
This was the nature of Sihanouk. It 
required a rather brlll1ant achievement: 
He was able to preserve· this balance for 
1!0 long a time. It is too bad that he 
decided to pack hlmsel! oft to Peking 
and Moscow. That will let him in for a 
lot of travel ~d trava.U. 
I agree that we were better oft when 
we had hl.m keeping Cambodia neutral. 
In my jud@lent •. there is not going to 
be· ~ expedfttonary force in Loas. 
Neither do I JJ61eve there will be any 
cq~ent of Ametil:an ground· forces 
irt.t~· . 
. ·~ we 1VDf do notWng to risk the 
~. ffi ~ rir ·by. actions which 
-we :~-111 ~to~. 
I -ha>ve lee!\ · no lndtcatJon that we 
intend to run the further risk of 
broadening that war. I hope we w1ll not. 
There are American forces close to that 
border in South Vietnam. They w1ll have 
to be protected. The interdiction of the 
Ho Chi Minh Trail will presumably con-
tinue. But I do not believe that this 
administration has any more intention 
of bringing any ground combat forces 
into Cambodia than we do of sending 
them into Laos. 
The sooner we get out of the whole 
embroiled peninsula, the better for all 
of us. 
I am satisfied that the administration 
is doing everything in its power to ac-
complish this objective which the Ameri-
an people want. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
agree wholeheartedly with what the dis-
tinguished minority leader has just said. 
I want to assure him that my purpose in 
speaking today is not to criticize the 
administration, but to try to be con-
structive and point out pitfalls and dan-
gers which may arise. I am sure the 
administration is fully aware of them, 
but I assume that some comment from 
the Senate is welcomed. 
I am heartened by what the minority 
l~ader said, because It indicates that so 
far as the joint leadership is concerned 
there is an identity of views. It 1s un-
fortunate t1Jat so many of our people 
have tended to look upon Prince Si-
hano'ijk as a playboy. He is a man of 
great ability and great capability, and 
great energy. He has had to perform a 
~chiavellian feat in keeping Cambodia 
independent and neutral since 1953, be-
cause Cambodia's in<ilependence was 
achieved even before the Geneva agree-
ments of 1954. 
So the purpose of this exchange as the 
dlstl.nguished minority leader pointed 
out by implication, is that we ought to 
be extremely careful. We should not be 
carried away by requests for this or that, 
not only as far as American personnel are 
concerned In both Laos and Cambodia, 
but also as far as American aid is con-
cerned. 
We should have learned our lesson and 
learned 1t well after what happened in 
Korea and what has been happening for 
all too long, for all too many years in 
South Vietnam. The figures there of what 
this war has cost us in manpower are 
appalling. The latest figures I have are as 
of March 19, less than 1 week ago and 
they indicate that as of then, last Thurs-
day, 269,719 Americans were wounded in 
South Vietnam, 40,947 were killed in 
combat, and '/,627 were killed in non-
<X>mbat capacities. The total casualties so 
far, and they are still increasing, amount 
to 318,293 as of 1 week ago. 
This is a high price to pay for an area 
which is not vital to the security of this 
country and never was. This is a high 
Price to pay for a war which was a mis-
take. This 1s a high .Price to pay for a 
war whicli is a continuing tragedy and 
affects all elements of our population. In 
my opinion, it has had a large role in the 
development of internal domestic di.1fi-
culties in this country. It has taken well 
over $100 billiOn of money to wage this 
war to which there really is no end in 
sight at the present time, money which 
In large part could better have been used 
to face up to problems of the ghettos, to 
meet the needs of our people, and in that 
way to be put to constructive use rather 
than destructive use. 
I want to commend the administration 
for what It is doing in this respect. for 
the firmness it 1s showing against advice 
I am sure has been advanced that we 
get behind this government in Cambodia: 
We do not know what kind of a· govern-
ment it is and only time will tell. In any 
event, I hope the admin1strat1on will 
show a forbearance in line with con-
gressional amendments that there be no 
use of U.S. ground combat troops in 
Laos or Cambodia .. 
I want to assure the administration. 
in my capacity as a Senator from Mon-
tana and a.s majority leader, that I w111 
continue to do my very best to support 
the administration in carrying out the 
Nixon policy, wblch I approve 100 per-
cent, of keeping a low profile In our re-
lations with nations not only In South-
east Asla but throughout the world, and 
in keeping to the phased withdrawals of 
our troops from Vietnam ; and hopefully, 
if the oppoo-tunity arises, Cambodia and 
Laos notv.rJ.thstanding, that that phased 
withdrawa.l can be increased consider-
ably. 
The President has tried through the 
Geneva accords, through the Interna-
tional Control Commission, and through 
private channels, with all means avail-
able at hiB command to bring about a 
lifting of this shadow which overhangs 
all of our lives, to the end that we can 
withdraw, lock, stock, and barrel, from all 
Southeast Asia. It is my hope that his 
efforts will bear fruit and that there will 
come a reconvening of the Geneva Con-
ference; and out of that an ironclad 
guarantee to which all Geneva nations 
would give assent. which would insure 
the neutrality of all Southeast Asia . In 
this way perhaps peace can be achieved. 
If we do not keep our feet on the path 
toward this objective, then I can see only 
increased costs, increased casualties, and 
I think we have h ad enough of both. 
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President. will the 
Senator yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am delighted to 
yield. 
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I do not 
want to prolong this discussion at all, 
other than Qnce more to say that the 
distinguished majority leader has shown 
his judgment and his patriotism mave 
hand in hand, as h e indicates his sup-
port for the efforts of the admlnistra-
tion. He and I both did our very vest 
with previous administrations and with 
the problems that were presented in for-
eign policy, to give support. We Jointly 
are now doing it again. 
I would add only one very small com-
ment which In no way changes anything 
· the majorlty leader said, and that is I 
often notice headlines to the e!Iect th a t 
we are in a new war In Laos. Mr. Presi-
dent, there is n o new war in Laos. Th!" 
commitment of Americans In Laos on 
the ground. and outside of the air inter-
dictions, has varied in the last several 
years between only 1,000 and 1,040 per-
sonnel, about one-half of which are 
civilians. Since J anuary 20, 1969, dea ths 
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in Laos on the ground have amounted 
to seven. one mlllta.ry and six civilian. 
This doe., not look like a new war. 
I say this only to make the point that 
we must not have even that many cas-
ualties in Cambodia. We must have no 
casualties whatever in Cambodia 1! we 
can avoid 1':, and the way to avoid It is 
to have no commitment in Cambodia, as 
the majority leader outlined, and that 
is the effort thx:ough many nations to 
preserve the neutrality of that troubled 
state. 
Lthank the Senator. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
thank the distinguished minority leader 
for his remarks. I must reiterate that 
what we are both trying to do Is to be 
oomtructive with an admin1stration 
whlch did not start the war, b4t which 
was saddled, in effect, with a number of 
problems connected with it, and a war 
wblch seems awfully difficult to di§-
~ga«e from at this time. 
I thank the distinguished minority 
leader. 
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